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The United States’ financial crisis left a massive cleanup bill in its 
wake and its victims are still searching for someone to pick up the tab.  The 
late 2000s saw extensive government involvement in the marketplace, 
including direct investment in auto companies and financial institutions.1  
In the eye of the storm, shareholders and non-shareholders welcomed, and 
even demanded, federal intervention.  As the sky clears, some 
commentators are questioning whether the government’s actions were 
appropriate.2  Even the beneficiaries of the government’s assistance are 
looking for compensation, resulting in public pushback.3 
 
 1.  See Sharon Silke Carty, After Crash and Government Control, Rebirth for GM, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 17, 2010, 8:10 PM, 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9JI6TKO0.htm (“By June 2009, GM had 
filed for bankruptcy.  It emerged relieved of most of its debt but mostly owned by the 
government and saddled with a damaging nickname: ‘Government Motors.’”). 
 2.  See Gretchen Morgenson, Greenberg Sues U.S. Over A.I.G. Takeover, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 21, 2011, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/business/greenberg-
sues-us-over-aig-takeover.html?_r=0 (“Critics have called the Fed’s decision [to bailout 
A.I.G.] a backdoor bailout for prosperous institutions that had dealings with A.I.G. . . . 
[These institutions] included Goldman Sachs, the French bank Société Générale and 
Deutsche Bank.”). 
 3.  See Matthew Phillips, Forget Gratitude: AIG Considers Suing U.S. Over Bailout, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 8, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-01-
08/forget-gratitude-aig-considers-suing-u-dot-s-dot-over-bailout (“At the behest of its 
former chief executive, Maurice Greenberg, AIG (AIG) is considering joining a lawsuit 
filed by its shareholders against the government. . . . Greenberg, 87, will try to persuade the 
AIG board that the terms of the company’s $182 billion government bailout were too 
onerous, the interest rates were too high, and ultimately, that AIG shareholders got a raw 
deal.”). 
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These events highlight what Professors Kahan and Rock have called 
the “problem of the government as a controlling shareholder.”4  Corporate 
law’s traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty appear to be 
inapplicable when the United States takes a controlling position in a 
company.  Not to be dissuaded, Maurice “Hank” Greenberg, former CEO 
of American International Group (AIG), has decided to test a novel theory 
in court—that AIG’s rescue constituted an unconstitutional taking of 
property from AIG and its shareholders’ property5—suing the United States 
for, at one point, roughly fifty-five billion dollars.6  Though he has received 
some bad press, some observers are applauding Greenberg’s willingness to 
find new shareholder protections.7 
This Comment analyzes the extent to which the Takings Clause can 
protect shareholders from government overreach and fill the void left by 
the absence of fiduciary duties.  Section I briefly explains the problems 
related to government control of a corporation.  Section II introduces 
takings jurisprudence and discusses the facts of the Starr case, as well as 
the takings theory the court applied.  Section III applies federal takings law, 
informed by the Starr case, to the facts of key fiduciary law cases but 
adjusts the facts to include the government as controlling shareholder.  The 
Comment then compares the results under fiduciary law, primarily 
Delaware’s, to the results under the hypothetical takings claims.  On 
balance, the Takings Clause imposes limitations on the federal shareholder, 
but only under narrow conditions, which significantly limit its applicability 
relative to the state fiduciary duties and leave the minority shareholder 
unprotected. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF THE GOVERNMENT AS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER 
The financial crisis saw several instances of government ownership in 
firms, from Citigroup to General Motors.  The surge in government equity 
stakes has displayed the tension between state fiduciary law and federal 
law.  Several commentators have addressed the issues arising when the 
government takes a controlling position in a corporation.8  The problems 
 
 4.  Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling 
Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1317 (2011).  
 5.  Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 54 (2012). 
 6.  Jonathan Stempel, Greenberg Doubles Claims in AIG Bailout Lawsuit vs U.S. to 
$55 Billion, REUTERS, Mar. 12, 2013, 3:42 PM, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/12/us-aig-greenberg-lawsuit-
idUSBRE92B10H20130312. 
 7.  See Phillips, supra note 3 (“Crass as [Greenberg’s suit] may be, it would be a smart 
business move [to return value to shareholders].”). 
 8.  See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1295-99 (providing an introduction to the 
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stem from a combination of the sovereign immunity of the United States, 
federal preemption, and corporate charter politics. 
First, “[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it 
consents to be sued[.]”9  The primary waivers of sovereign immunity stem 
from the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),10 the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA),11 and the Tucker Act.12  An extensive discussion of the FTCA 
and APA is beyond the scope of this Comment.  However, neither statute 
provides a promising route to a suit for breach of fiduciary law.13  The 
Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity as to claims for money damages 
against the United States, and grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of 
Federal Claims for claims over ten thousand dollars.14  While this waiver, 
like others, does not incorporate state fiduciary law, it is the primary means 
to sustain a takings claim against the United States.15 
Also, state fiduciary law is unlikely to apply in most cases of 
government bailouts, especially when the vehicle for the bailout is a federal 
agency.  When a lawsuit involves federal entities, such as the Federal 
Reserve banks, carrying out congressionally provided powers, federal 
common law will normally apply.16  Federal courts will not incorporate 
 
problem); J.W. Verret, Treasury, Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and 
Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 299-307 (2010) (using the example of the government’s 
Citigroup bailout to explain the problem).  
 9.  United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (citing United States v. 
Thompson, 98 U.S. 486 (1878), United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), Kansas v. 
United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907), Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 387 (1939), 
Kiefer & Kiefer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939), and United States 
v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940)). 
 10.  28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). 
 11.  5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
 12.  28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006). 
 13.  See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1325-1346 (discussing the shortcomings of 
these statutory regimes). 
 14.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1491: 
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render 
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the 
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive 
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or 
for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviews the decisions of the Court of 
Federal Claims. 
 15.  See GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 329 (4th ed. 
2006) (“The Tucker Act not only is presumptively available, but also is presumptively the 
exclusive vehicle by which to seek compensation for a taking.”). 
 16.  See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979) (“Since the 
[Small Business Administration and the Farmers Home Administration] derive their 
authority to effectuate loan transactions from specific Acts of Congress passed in the 
exercise of a ‘constitutional function or power,’ their rights, as well, should derive from a 
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state law into those rules of decision “[where the] application of state law 
would frustrate specific objectives of . . . federal programs.”17  Given that 
instances of government control often result from dire threats to the 
national or global economy, a court, either state or federal, is unlikely to 
insert itself into a rescue situation and disrupt the federal government’s 
goals.18 
The politics of corporate charters also plays into the inapplicability of 
state fiduciary law.  Many states, most importantly Delaware, depend on 
the revenue from corporate charter taxes.  Congress, however, would be 
able to federalize corporate law through the interaction of the Commerce 
and Supremacy clauses.19  Even if a plaintiff could drag the United States 
before the Delaware Court of Chancery, the court would likely be 
unwilling to uphold the plaintiff’s claims as a political matter.20  For these 
reasons, the disgruntled minority shareholder is left searching for a creative 
avenue for relief.  Takings claims present one such option.21 
II. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
This section provides a background in takings law principles and 
describes the takings theory presented in Starr Int’l v. United States.22  
Synthesizing the sprawling body of takings jurisprudence presents 
difficulties for even the most adept commenters,23 but this section provides 
 
federal source.”) (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943)). 
 17.  Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 728.  In those cases, “[The court] must fashion special rules 
solicitous of those federal interests.”  Id. 
 18.  See, e.g., Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202, 214-15 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding Delaware fiduciary law inapplicable on grounds of both federal 
common law and as a matter of federal preemption); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to 
Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use 
of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 744-745 (2009) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Prevent Hard 
Cases] (explaining “Delaware’s dilemma” in being caught between disrupting its own 
fiduciary law and undercutting the government’s plans for Bear Stearns).  
 19.  See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1324 (“Delaware’s franchise-tax business lives 
by the grace of the federal government.  Congress could, in one fell swoop, wipe out this 
business by federalizing corporate law.”) (citing Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 588, 600-07 (2004)). 
 20.  See id. (noting that members of Delaware’s judiciary are aware of the state’s 
interests — one being to avoid “annoying” the federal government). 
 21.  Other commenters have also discussed the possibility of a takings claim.  J.W. 
Verret analyzed it briefly and identified some significant shortcomings.  Verret, supra note 
8, at 308.  Kahan and Rock noted the Tucker Act’s cause of action for a takings claim, and 
the creative potential for such a claim.  Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1341 n. 201.  
 22.  106 Fed. Cl. 50 (2012). 
 23.  Cf. Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 307, 310 (2007) (“Any effort to distill a body of case law as sprawling as that 
construing Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is sure to leave some unsatisfied.”) (internal 
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a starting point from which to discuss the Starr case in the Court of Federal 
Claims.  In that case, the court focuses its analysis on the Penn Central24 
factors and provides an indication as to how courts will look at cases of 
government ownership in the future. 
A. Background Primer on Takings 
To understand the nature of these lawsuits, some background in 
takings jurisprudence is necessary.  The Supreme Court elucidated the 
background principle of the Takings Clause in Armstrong v. United 
States.25  The constitutional provision “was designed to bar Government 
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”26  However, 
the law must identify important limitations to prevent citizens from 
challenging every government action.27  The Fifth Amendment requires 
compensation for government action when (1) the government engages in a 
taking, which can be either possessory or regulatory, (2) it takes property, 
and (3) the taking is for public use.28 
Whether the government has crossed the threshold to a taking is often 
unclear.29  The classic case of a taking is the physical ousting of a 
landowner from his property.  For some time, “it was generally thought that 
the Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property.”30  
The U.S. Supreme Court then developed the concept of a “regulatory 
taking” in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon to account for government actions 
that are not physical, but nevertheless go “too far.”31  Defining “too far” is 
the source of much of the apparent disarray in takings jurisprudence.32  A 
 
footnote omitted). 
 24.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978). 
 25.  364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
 26.  Id. at 49. 
 27.  See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government hardly could 
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying 
for every change in the general law.”). 
 28.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.4.1, at 
656 (4th ed. 2011).   
 29.  See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123 (“The question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty.”). 
 30.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).  
 31.  260 U.S. at 415 (1922). 
 32.  See id. at 416 (explaining that when a regulation becomes a taking “is a question of 
degree — and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions.”); see also David 
Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L.J. 97, 132 (2010) (noting that “[i]n cases where a 
regulatory scheme does not involve a physical invasion or occupation of property, the 
Supreme Court has generally been unable to develop any set formula for determining when 
justice and fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action result in a 
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regulation that results in a permanent physical intrusion into a person’s 
property33 or that deprives the owner of all its economic benefits34 are 
takings which categorically require compensation.  There are, however, 
other takings that may fall short of a “total taking”35 but are nevertheless 
compensable.  To identify those scenarios, the Supreme Court has  
identified three factors which have “particular significance”: (1) 
“the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”; (2) “the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations”; and (3) “the character of the 
governmental action.”36   
If a person acquires property that is encumbered by common law 
regulations, then the acquirer may not challenge the regulation as a 
taking.37  The potential takings claims resulting from government-
controlled companies would likely present this last, Penn Central-type 
claim. 
In certain cases, the court will ask whether the burdens the 
government imposes on the citizen’s property are roughly proportionate to 
the government’s interest in the regulation.  In Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, the government required a landowner to grant the public an 
easement to access a beach as a condition for a building permit.38  The 
Court held that the regulation went beyond the government’s police power.  
It could, for example, require certain development standards so that the 
building would not affect the beach.  The easement requirement imposed 
by the municipality, however, resulted in a “permanent physical 
occupation.”39  Later, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court clarified the 
test.40  First, courts should ask whether there is a “nexus . . . between a 
legitimate state interest and the permit condition” created by the city.41  
Then, courts ask whether there is “rough proportionality” between the 
 
compensable taking.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 33.  See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (“When 
faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property, 
this Court has invariably found a taking.”). 
 34.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
 35.  Id. at 1030. 
 36.  Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986) 
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978)).  But see 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (criticizing the imprecision in analyzing the diminution in the 
value of the property interest). 
 37.  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 640 n.3 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring 
and dissenting).  
 38.  483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).  
 39.  Id. at 831. 
 40.  512 U.S. 374, 383-88 (1994). 
 41.  Id. at 386 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837). 
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development exactions and the government’s interest in regulation.42  To 
meet that standard, the government must show “some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and 
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”43  This rule appears 
useful to Starr and other shareholders requesting scrutiny of government 
ownership.  Courts, however, have not applied the test outside the context 
of land use exactions.  As discussed later, the Court of Federal Claims was 
unwilling to extend the rule outside those boundaries in Starr.44 
The second criterion, whether what the government has taken was 
property, refers to the whole of the “group of rights inhering in the citizen’s 
relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of 
it.”45  Traditionally, the court looks to “existing rules or understandings that 
stem from an independent source such as state law to define the . . . 
interests that qualify for protection . . . under the [Takings Clause].”46  
Value alone is not sufficient to provide property status.47  Rather, the court 
determines “whether or not the alleged property had the hallmark rights of 
transferability and excludability, which indicia are part of an individual’s 
bundle of property rights.”48  These definitions of property impose a 
significant limitation on the extent to which takings will be able to replicate 
fiduciary law. 
Finally, the government takes property for public use when it uses the 
property for a “legitimate purpose of government” and the use of the 
property to achieve that goal is rational.49  Importantly, the Fifth 
Amendment itself does not prohibit the public taking in the first place, but 
requires only adequate compensation.50  While the government may not 
merely take a private person’s property and transfer it to another private 
party, even if it fairly compensates the first party,51 the government may 
 
 42.  Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388. 
 43.  Id. at 391. 
 44.  Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 82 (2012). 
 45.  United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). 
 46.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 47.  Lack of market value, however, does not preclude property status.  Phillips v. 
Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 157 (1998). 
 48.  Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 49.  Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984).  
 50.  See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., Cal., 
482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987) (“[The Takings Clause] does not prohibit the taking of private 
property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.”). 
 51.  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (“[I]t has long been 
accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of 
transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”). 
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take one’s private property for a public use as long as the government 
adequately compensates the party who was deprived of her property.52  
Some history may suggest that there might be an exception to the Takings 
Clause in times of emergency, but those cases were not readily accepted at 
the time and have been largely rejected today.53  Starr presents the case of 
government intervention in the market for the purpose of stabilizing a 
financial system on the point of collapse.  In at least one of the alleged 
takings, the Government transferred property to a private party.54  The 
government cannot shield itself with an emergency exception.  Even if the 
Court of Federal Claims finds a taking, it will not completely reverse the 
government’s action, but it may require the government to compensate 
shareholders. 
B. Relevant Facts in Starr 
The Starr case arose from the government’s bailout of AIG in the fall 
of 2008, as the country was in the midst of what has been dubbed the 
“Great Recession.”55  AIG’s struggles arose from their credit default swap 
business and resulting collateral risk.  The resulting liquidity problems and 
collapse disrupted the financial markets and the government intervened 
after private arrangements failed.  The government provided a loan to AIG 
and received an equity stake in the company and also provided for the 
winding up of some of AIG’s outstanding derivative contracts.56 
 
 52.  Id. at 477. 
 53.  Compare United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 153 (1952) 
(finding no taking where “the sole objective of destroying property of strategic value to 
prevent the enemy from using it to wage war more successfully”), with Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (requiring compensation “no matter how 
minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it”) and United 
States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115-17 (1951) (finding a taking in the confiscation 
of a coal mine, even though it was war time); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 661-
62 (discussing these cases in more detail). 
 54.  See infra II.C.3.b. for the description of the Maiden Lane III transactions. 
 55.  See Bernard Condon & Paul Wiseman, AP IMPACT: Recession, Tech Kill Middle-
Class Jobs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 23, 2013, 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2013-01-23/ap-impact-recession-tech-kill-middle-class-
jobs (“Five years after the start of the Great Recession, the toll is terrifyingly clear:  Millions 
of middle-class jobs have been lost in developed countries the world over.”). 
 56.  For additional overviews of the AIG bailout, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, FINANCIAL CRISIS: REVIEW OF FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO 
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (2011), [hereinafter GAO REPORT] and William K. 
Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009). 
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1. AIG’s Credit Default Swap Business and its Collateral Risk 
The collapse of the real estate market and the resulting Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy shook the foundations of many financial institutions, 
including AIG.  As 2008 began, AIG and its subsidiaries were writing 
$47.1 billion in net premiums, employed approximately 116,000 people,57 
and serviced more than seventy-six million customers.58  AIG remains a 
massive organization of subsidiaries that provides life insurance and 
financial planning services to institutions and individual customers in over 
130 countries.59 
AIG, like many other financial institutions, entered into derivative 
contracts through a subsidiary, AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), to insure 
its clients’ financial transactions.60  One such derivate contract is a credit 
default swap (CDS), wherein AIG assumed the risk of default on a set of 
debt securities.61  Some of these CDSs referenced collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs), structured investment products which themselves 
referenced other assets, commonly fixed-income assets.62  These underlying 
assets often included the now infamous mortgage-backed securities 
(MBSs) exposed to subprime mortgage debt.63  Swap contracts generally 
require counterparties to deliver collateral to one another as the value of the 
underlying assets changes.  The collateral requirement of the CDS contracts 
posed an additional liquidity risk to AIG beyond the risk of outright 
default.64 
2. Financial Collapse and AIG’s Ensuing Liquidity Problems 
AIG’s risk exposure soared as the real estate market collapsed in 2007 
and the resulting global financial crisis took hold.  As of December 31, 
 
 57.  Am. Int’l Group, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Feb. 28, 2008) [hereinafter 
AIG Form 10-K 2008]. 
 58.  Actions Related to AIG, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. 
3,http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/aig/index.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
 59.  Am. Int’l Group, Preliminary Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus Dated June 29, 
2012 (Final Prospectus Supplement), at S-1 (Aug. 3, 2012). 
 60.  Am. Int’l Group, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 132 (Mar. 2, 2009) [hereinafter 
AIG Form 10-K 2009].  As with traditional insurance contracts, AIG would receive periodic 
payments, though that is where the similarities end. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 132-34; GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 5. 
 63.  AIG Form 10-K 2008, supra note 57, at 122. 
 64.  See id. (“Certain of these credit derivatives are subject to collateral posting 
provisions.”).  These contracts require parties to deliver to one another marketable assets, if 
not solely cash or cash equivalents, which can cause massive liquidity strain. 
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2007, AIGFP held $527 billion in notional value of credit default swaps.65  
Of that amount, seventy-nine billion dollars in notional were “multi-sector 
CDOs” containing $61.4 billion in exposure to domestic subprime 
mortgages.66  AIG reported an unrealized market valuation loss of over 
eleven billion dollars that year.67  “In the second half of 2008, AIG 
experienced an unprecedented strain on liquidity” driven, in part, by 
collateral calls from AIGFP’s CDO counterparties.68  Starr contends that, 
during this time, the government withheld access to the Federal Reserve’s 
discount window even as it provided access to other institutions.69  On 
September 15, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for bankruptcy, 
sending shock waves through the financial system.70  The following day 
AIG failed to secure a private solution to its liquidity problems.71 
3. The Government’s Deal with AIG 
The terms of the rescue form the core of the Starr litigation.  The 
government’s deal with AIG involved both (a) a loan from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and (b) the government receiving a 
sizable equity stake in AIG.  It also involved the closing of certain 
outstanding derivative contracts.  Starr has argued that each of these 
provisions constituted a government taking. 
a. FRBNY’s Loan Facility and Equity Stake 
On September 16, 2008, the government offered AIG access to the 
Federal Reserve discount window on specific terms.72  The government 
offered AIG: (a) an FRBNY revolving credit facility to AIG of eighty-five 
billion dollars, secured by AIG’s assets, (b) a requirement that the 
government be given control of AIG as controlling lender and controlling 
shareholder, and (c) a provision that the government receive nearly an 
 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  AIG Form 10-K 2009, supra note 60, at 40.  S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch all 
downgraded AIG’s long-term debt on September 15, 2008.  Id. 
 69.  Verified Class Action Complaint at ¶ 42, Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. 
Cl. 50 (2012) (No. 11-779C) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 70.  Kristina Cooke, US STOCKS - Wall Street Mauled by Lehman Bankruptcy, AIG 
Fears, REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/09/15/markets-stocks-
idUKN1529545420080915. 
 71.  AIG Form 10-K 2009, supra note 60, at 4.  For a more detailed timeline of events 
leading up to the Government’s action, see GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 14. 
 72.  GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 7-8. 
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eighty percent stake in AIG.73  AIG and the FRBNY signed a Credit 
Agreement on September 22, 2008, consistent with those terms.74  A trust 
was established to which AIG would make interest payments and to which 
AIG issued Series C Preferred Stock convertible to common stock.75  AIG 
was to receive five hundred thousand dollars in purchase price for these 
shares “with an understanding that additional and independently sufficient 
consideration was also furnished to AIG by the [FRBNY] in the form of its 
lending commitment.”76  The preferred stock was issued to a trust 
established for the sole benefit of the United States Treasury.77  Although 
the ownership stake would permit the trust “to elect all of AIG’s 
directors,”78 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
found that the government did not manifest its control of AIG.79 
AIG and the Trust signed a subsequent Stock Purchase Agreement to 
facilitate the conversion of the preferred stock to common shares.80  There 
 
 73.  Id. at 7-8, 102 n.136. 
 74.  Credit Agreement Between American International Group, Inc., Borrower, and 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Lender 1 (Sept. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/aig/pdf/original_credit_agreement.pdf [hereinafter 
Credit Agreement].  
 75.  AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement Among Federal Reserve Bank of New York., 
and Jill M. Considine, Chester B. Feldberg & Douglas L. Foshee, Trustees 1 (January 16, 
2009), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/AIGCFTAgreement.pdf 
[hereinafter Trust Agreement]; see also Press Release, Am. Int’l Group, AIG Notice (Sept. 
26, 2008), http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/76/76115/releases/092608a.pdf 
(noting that the preferred stock would be convertible to common stock “following a special 
shareholders meeting to amend AIG’s restated certificate of incorporation”); The A.I.G. 
Bailout Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Sept. 24, 2008, 9:23 AM, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/the-aig-bailout-takes-shape/ (outlining the terms of 
AIG’s deal with FRBNY); A.I.G.: So Many Questions, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Sept. 18, 
2008, 10:46 AM, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/aig-so-many-questions/ 
(detailing some of the legal questions pertaining to the AIG’s deal). 
 76.  Am. Int’l Grp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 10 (May 7, 2009). 
 77.  AIG Form 10-K 2009, supra note 60, at 26. 
 78.  Id. at 27.  The Trust Agreement provided that the trustees controlling the stock 
would have the “exclusive right to vote the Trust Stock.”  Trust Agreement, supra note 75, 
at 6.  Additionally, the Agreement prohibited the Trustees from voting “to elect . . . as 
members of the board of directors of [AIG] only persons who are not, and have not been 
within one year of their nomination, officers, directors, or senior employees of the FRBNY 
or the Treasury Department.”  Id. at 7. 
 79.  Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
 80.  Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement 
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was, however, one snag in this plan.  AIG’s certificate of incorporation did 
not authorize enough common shares to convert the government’s preferred 
shares.81  The charter only authorized five billion common shares, of which 
around three billion had been issued or reserved.82  According to Starr, only 
about 40% of the Government’s shares could be issued on the conversion.83  
Under Delaware law, an increase in the number of authorized shares 
requires a shareholder vote, with common shareholders voting as a class, to 
amend the charter.84 
The shareholders had an opportunity to vote on proposals to amend 
the charter to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock at 
the June 30, 2009 meeting.85  The vote to increase the number of authorized 
shares failed with the common stockholders voting as a separate class.  The 
proxy statement, however, also contained a proposal “to effect a reverse 
stock split of AIG’s outstanding common stock at a ratio of one-for-
twenty.”86  The reverse stock split passed with the government’s controlling 
vote participating.87  The split reduced the number of issued common 
shares to 150 million, thereby leaving around 4.85 billion shares authorized 
 
 81.  See Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of American International 
Group, Inc. 2 (June 30, 2009) (authorizing 5.1 billion shares).  This issue did not hamper the 
issuance of the preferred shares because AIG had a “blank check” provision in their charter 
for preferred share issuance.  Id. at 2-4. 
 82.  Id. at 2; American International Group, Proxy Statement 65 (June 5, 2009), 
available at http://www.aig.com/Chartis/internet/US/en/2009proxy_tcm3171-440898.pdf 
[hereinafter Proxy Statement]. 
 83.  Complaint, supra note 69, at ¶ 97. 
 84.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (West 2014). 
 85.  See Proxy Statement, supra note 82, at 64–70 (explaining proposed amendments to 
AIG’s Certificate of Incorporation).  In that proxy card, AIG stated, “[t]he primary purpose 
of the reverse stock split is to increase the per share trading price of AIG Common Stock.”  
Id. at 66. 
 86.  American International Group, Notice to Annual Meeting of Shareholders to be 
Held June 30, 2009 (June 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.aig.com/Chartis/internet/US/en/2009proxy_tcm3171-440898.pdf.  A reverse 
stock split accomplishes two goals: reducing the number of outstanding shares and 
increasing the per share stock price.  This proposal meant, for example, that a holder of 
twenty common shares would receive one share after the split.  Generally, there is no 
economic effect of a stock split, as the company’s value has not changed, although 
frequently there are financial justifications for engaging in such a maneuver.  Cf. Michael 
Russnow, AIG Proposed Reverse Stock Split: Shareholders Should Vote This Down as a No-
Brainer, HUFFINGTON POST, June 27, 2009, 5:42 AM, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-russnow/aig-proposed-reverse-stoc_b_221801.html 
(mentioning the potential for new issuance and dilution). 
 87.  See Lila Zuill, AIG Reverse Stock Split Fails to Boost Shares, REUTERS, July 1, 
2009, http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/07/01/idINN0149895120090701 (noting the 
occurrence of the reverse stock split and commenting on subsequent drop in AIG’s share 
price). 
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and unissued.88  The government converted its preferred shares on January 
14, 2011, at the closing of the Recapitalization Plan.89  Starr contends that 
this conversion “completed” the government’s taking of the shareholders’ 
economic and voting interest in their shares.90  The Trust went on to 
appoint eight of AIG’s twelve directors by November 2011.91  From then 
until September 2012, the Government significantly wound down its 
position in AIG, though the board composition had not changed through 
June 26, 2013.92 
b. Maiden Lane III Transactions 
Apart from the reverse stock split and subsequent conversion to 
common shares, Starr also complained of the government’s “backdoor 
bailouts” of AIG’s counterparties.93  The FRBNY had created a special 
purpose fund, Maiden Lane III (ML III), to resolve issues related to AIG’s 
CDS contracts.94  FRBNY debated three capital structures for ML III: (1) 
AIG contributes equity, and FRBNY contributes a loan to fund ML III’s 
purchase of the underlying CDOs; (2) AIG contributes equity, and both 
FRBNY and AIG’s counterparties contribute a loan to fund the CDO 
purchase; and (3) AIG contributes equity, and FRBNY contributes a 
guarantee to secure ML III’s guarantee of any CDO contracts that might 
default.95  The latter two options likely would have cost less for AIG in the 
end, but would have required significant negotiations with AIG’s 
counterparties.96  Ultimately, FRBNY decided on the first option.  AIG 
contributed five billion dollars in equity, to be exhausted first, and FRBNY 
provided $24.3 billion in a loan facility.97  ML III then purchased the 
underlying CDO contracts for par value (face value of the contract), less 
the collateral protection already posted by AIG. 
 
 88.  Proxy Statement, supra note 82, at 65. 
 89.  Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York Fed Ends AIG Assistance 
with Full Repayment (Jan. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/aboutthefed/2011/oa110114.html; see also 
AIG Recapitalization: Summary of Terms of September 30, 2010 1 (Sept. 2010), available 
at http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/aig/pdf/Recapitalization_Summary_Terms.pdf 
(authorizing the conversation). 
 90.  Complaint, supra note 69, at ¶ 101. 
 91.  Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 466 (2013) [hereinafter Starr Int’l 
Co. II]. 
 92.  Id. at 465. 
 93.  Complaint, supra note 69, at ¶ 103. 
 94.  Id. at ¶ 112. 
 95.  GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 59. 
 96.  See id. at 61 (discussing the relative merits of each structure). 
 97.  Id. at 64. 
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Accounts differ as to how this decision to pay par value was made,98 
but some matters are clear.  FRBNY had contacted some of AIG’s 
counterparties to discuss a discount purchase price for the CDOs.  After 
initial pushback from the counterparties, FRBNY ultimately offered to 
purchase the assets at par value without a loan contribution from the 
counterparties.  According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report, “[t]he counterparties’ differing situations and varying 
perceptions of the benefit of ML III participation might have offered an 
opportunity to lower the amount FRBNY lent to ML III if FRBNY had 
been able to negotiate individually with the counterparties based on their 
individual circumstances.”99  FRBNY officials were concerned with having 
a deal in place before the November 10, 2008 target date.100  Engaging in 
lengthy discount negotiations would mean risking additional collateral 
requirements, credit downgrades, and further market disruption.101  One 
official noted that “any further downgrades to AIG’s long-term credit 
rating would have been catastrophic and would most likely have led to an 
AIG bankruptcy.”102  Officials were also concerned about the propriety of 
the FRBNY pushing for discounts, the valuation of an appropriate discount 
from par, and the FRBNY’s lack of bargaining power in the negotiations.103 
Starr maintains that the FRBNY decision to forgo concessions from 
AIG counterparties and to pay close to par value for the CDOs constituted a 
taking.  The complaint refers to these payments as “backdoor bailouts” to 
the financial institutions on the other side of the contracts.104  The Special 
Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) 
addressed the issue in a November 17, 2009 report.  It recognizes that then-
President of FRBNY Timothy Geithner and FRBNY’s general counsel 
denied any intent to facilitate a bailout of AIG’s counterparties.  The report 
maintains:  
[i]rrespective of their stated intent, however, there is no question 
that the effect of FRBNY’s decisions—indeed, the very design of 
the federal assistance to AIG—was that tens of billions of dollars 
of Government money was funneled inexorably and directly into 
AIG’s counterparties.105 
 
 98.  See id. at 72 (detailing the much different stance of AIG’s counterparties). 
 99.  Id. at 85. 
 100.  Id. at 73. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLE ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, 
FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES 13 (2009) 
[hereinafter SIGTARP REPORT]. 
 103.  GAO REPORT, supra note 56, at 73-74. 
 104.  Complaint, supra note 69, ¶ 103.  
 105.  SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 102, at 30. 
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C. The Takings Theory in Starr International 
Starr presents a unique way of looking at takings claims as a 
substitute for the lack of fiduciary protections.  The particular facts of the 
case are critical to understanding the court’s opinion on the Government’s 
motion to dismiss.  The takings claims principally stem from two sources: 
(1) the government’s acquisition of AIG’s common stock; and (2) certain 
transactions with AIG’s swap counterparties.  The court’s opinion largely 
turns on the definition of property and when the plaintiff can claim the 
government took that property.  The court’s method of analyzing this case 
provides an important example for the potential replication of fiduciary 
claims in other circumstances of government ownership. 
1. Arguments in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims 
Starr filed both direct and derivative claims in the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims on November 21, 2011, arguing that the United States had 
violated its and AIG’s rights under the Due Process, Equal Protection, and 
Takings Clauses.106  Only the takings claims are relevant here.  Starr argued 
that the government required AIG to convey a 79.9% equity stake in the 
company without adequate compensation to common shareholders, the 
government allegedly took advantage of the market conditions to coerce 
AIG into the Credit Agreement, and AIG received only $500,000 for the 
Series C Preferred Shares, which had a market value of about twenty-three 
billion dollars.107  Half of a million dollars was not adequate compensation 
for the preferred shares, even taking into account the government’s loan.  
The government had already received adequate compensation for the loan, 
because AIG had agreed to pay 14.5% in interest (a rate well above market 
rates and discount rates charged to other financial institutions) and fully 
secured the loan with AIG’s assets.108  Since AIG had already supplied 
consideration for the loan, it was effectively uncompensated for the 
additional equity stake, thus constituting an unconstitutional taking.  Starr 
argued that the reverse stock split and subsequent conversion “completed” 
the government’s taking of the shareholders’ property109 in what it called a 
“backdoor conversion[.]”110 
In addition, Starr argued that the ML III transactions were executed 
for the purpose of bailing out AIG’s counterparties, many of whom were 
 
106.   Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 54 (2012). 
 107.  Id. at 56-57. 
 108.  Id. at 57. 
 109.  Complaint, supra note 69, ¶ 101. 
 110.  Id. at ¶ 103. 
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other major financial institutions.111  Starr maintains that FRBNY 
controlled and managed the ML III.  FRBNY allowed AIGFP’s 
counterparties to retain the entirety of the collateral posted to ML III and 
paid par value to cancel the CDS contracts, in order to effect a “backdoor 
bailout” of those counterparties.112  Starr maintains that these contracts 
could have been cancelled for far less cost to AIG.113  Once the CDOs were 
in the ML III fund, FRBNY received the majority of the returns despite the 
fact that AIG funded “approximately [sixty percent] of the par value 
purchase price” through its collateral posting and five billion dollars in 
equity.114  The ML III structure contained a “waterfall” provision 
specifying that the proceeds from the transactions would first pay for ML 
III’s expenses, then to repay the FRBNY’s loan to ML III.115  Any “residual 
interests” were to be split between FRBNY, which was to receive two-
thirds of the proceeds, and AIG, which was to receive the remaining 
third.116  Because the two-thirds share was provided after the loan and 
expenses were already paid to the government, Starr alleges that FRBNY 
appropriated two-thirds of those residual interests without justification.117 
The government first argued, on motion to dismiss, that Starr had not 
adequately specified what events constituted a taking.118  Starr’s argument 
that the government’s actions in the “aggregate” constituted a taking was 
not an adequate pleading because it could not specify when the taking took 
place.119  Next, the government argued that its actions were not of the sort 
necessary to state a taking claim.  In its view, there are only two kinds of 
takings: (1) “physical invasion or appropriation of private property,” and 
(2) takings resulting from unduly burdensome regulations.120  A physical 
taking means “required acquiescence [where] the owner is forced to 
surrender the property under threat of legal sanction.”121  AIG freely 
accepted the government’s offer of an eighty-five billion dollar loan instead 
of enduring a likely bankruptcy.  A taking does not follow from the fact 
that turning down the terms of the government’s offer would entail 
 
 111.  Id. at ¶ 103-108 (referencing statements from former Treasury Secretary Robert 
Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, 
and then-AIG CEO Edward Liddy).  
 112.  Id. at ¶ 131-32. 
 113.  Id. at ¶ 117. 
 114.  Id. at ¶ 121. 
 115.  Id. at ¶ 118. 
 116.  Id. at ¶ 119 
 117.  Id. at ¶ 121. 
118.   Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 24, Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 
50 (2012) (No. 11-779C) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss]. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 26. 
 121.  Id. at 27 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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substantial sacrifice or disadvantage.122  Although Starr alleged adverse 
action from the government if the offer had been rejected, any compulsion 
AIG felt was created by its own business risks, not by the government.123  
The government, furthermore, rejected the contention that it had compelled 
AIG to accept its terms, maintaining that AIG’s decision “was an exercise 
of business judgment, not an involuntary action.”124  Compensating AIG for 
the risks it created would run counter to the Armstrong justification for 
takings claims.125  Moreover, the conversion itself cannot be a taking 
because AIG received preferred shares in exchange for giving AIG 
common shares to the government.126  Regarding the ML III claims, the 
government argued that Starr failed to allege what the government did to 
cause the transactions.  AIG consented to the establishment of the ML III 
vehicle and took the financing to complete the transactions.127 
Furthermore, the government disputed the fact that it took a property 
interest from either Starr or AIG.  It argued that neither Starr nor AIG 
possessed a property right in the FRBNY’s loan or “a loan based upon any 
particular terms.”128  FRBNY had no obligation to provide a loan to AIG, 
only the discretion to provide it, so no property interest could attach.129  
Likewise, FRBNY could have legally denied access to any loan.  Also, the 
statute authorizing FRBNY to make loans does not specify particular terms 
for those loans.130 
As to Starr’s property interests, the government argued, Starr lost 
nothing because it retains its shares in AIG.  Even if the government’s 
conversion to common shares diminished shareholders’ value, Starr’s 
common stock does not entitle it to a certain value or percentage share in 
the corporation, so it did not possess a property interest.131  Furthermore, 
 
 122.  Id. at 27-28 (citing Cal. Hous. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 959 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992); Evans v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 554, 558-64 (2006), aff’d, 250 Fed. App’x 
321 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Turntable Fishery & Moorage Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 256, 
263 (2002)).  
 123.  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 118, at 29.  The government argued that “[i]t has 
become settled law that the mere stress of business conditions will not constitute duress 
where the defendant was not responsible for those circumstances.”  Id. (internal quotations 
and citation omitted). 
 124.  Id. at 30. 
 125.  Id. at 31.  The government argued that “[t]he rescue of AIG cannot be distorted into 
a taking” because fairness does not require that losses resulting from the rescue be borne by 
the public when a private party is the intended beneficiary of the rescue.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 32. 
 127.  Id. at 33. 
 128.  Id. at 34. 
 129.  Id. at 34-35 (citing Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 2012 WL 
148692, at *1-2 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 130.  Id. at 35-36 (citing Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006)).  
 131.  Id. at 37 (citing Broad v. Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422, 430 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
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although Starr alleges that the government took control of AIG, Starr’s 
common stock interest did not include the right to prevent another party 
from taking control or from diluting the common shares.132  In that way, 
Starr’s interest did not include the right to exclude — a fundamental 
property right.133  Finally, any business or investment interest that Starr 
may have had in the value of the shares was merely a collateral interest, 
which cannot form the basis for a takings claim.134 
Likewise, the government did not take a property interest during the 
ML III transactions.  Starr failed to allege that it or AIG owned the ML III 
proceeds that it says the government took.  The government characterized 
ML III as merely an obligation for AIG to pay money, which does not 
support the notion that it is a property interest.135  Any “residual interest” 
that AIG may have received was merely “an abstract sum of money 
potentially capable of being counted,” rather than a vested property right.136  
Furthermore, the government argued that AIG never had a right to receive 
any more than one-third of the residual interests in ML III.  Therefore, even 
if the residual interests were property rights, the government did not take 
them.137 
2. Suit in the Court of Federal Claims 
In January 2012, the Court of Federal Claims issued an opinion on the 
government’s motion to dismiss.138  The court granted the motion to 
dismiss as to the Due Process and Equal Protection claims.  Critically, 
however, the court denied the motion as to the takings claims, with few 
exceptions.139  The court found that Starr had identified the taking itself 
with adequate specificity.  First, the government “imposed” the Credit 
Agreement on AIG in order to take the preferred stock.140  Second, the 
reverse stock split diluted the common stock, taking the majority control 
 
 132.  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 118, at 37. 
133.   See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing 
the right to exclude others as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property”). 
 134.  Motion to Dismiss, supra note 118, at 38. 
 135.  Id. at 39. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 40. 
 138.  Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 50 (2012).  Starr also filed a claim 
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.  That complaint was 
dismissed for failure to state a claim.  Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. 
Supp. 2d 202, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 139.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 55.  The court also denied any claims that would be 
duplicative of one another.  Id.   
 140.  Id. at 68. 
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from the common shareholders.141  Third, Starr had established that the ML 
III transactions constituted a taking.142  Finally, the conversion of the 
preferred shares to common shares “completed the Government’s 
taking.”143  This last alleged taking could not be meritorious if the second 
allegation is valid, since the equity interest would already have been taken.  
Therefore, the court only recognized three alleged takings here.144 
a. Economic and voting interests of AIG common shareholders 
The Court of Federal Claims found a property interest in the economic 
and voting powers of the AIG common shares.145  Notably, the U.S. 
Constitution does not define the property interests protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.146  “[B]ackground principles and existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . 
define the range of interests that qualify for protection as property under 
the Fifth Amendment.”147  The court analyzed the transferability and 
excludability of common shares, as these qualities are “part of an 
individual’s bundle of property rights.”148  Delaware law supports the 
transferability of the equity and voting power of common shares.149 
Exclusion was a more complicated matter.  Some scholars have 
considered the right to exclude the most important or even the sole 
condition for a property interest.150  The court defined the issue as whether 
common shareholders had a right to prevent dilution of their shares 
“through a separate class vote or otherwise . . . .”151  Delaware corporate 
law does not guarantee common shareholders a class-wise vote on the 
reverse stock split.  Starr claimed, however, that AIG had represented 
before the Court of Chancery that the common shareholders would have a 
separate vote on any proposal affecting the number of authorized shares or 
 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 69 (internal quotations omitted). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 75. 
 146.  Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 147.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 72 (internal quotations omitted). 
 148.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 149.  Id. at 73 (citing Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 25 (Del. Ch. 1982), which held 
that “Delaware law has for quite some time permitted stockholders wide latitude in 
decisions affecting the restriction or transfer of voting rights.”). 
 150.  See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2 (defining property as “that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external thing of 
the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”). 
 151.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 73. 
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the par value of common shares.152  The Court of Federal Claims 
interpreted the Court of Chancery’s order to mean that the shareholders 
maintained protection from the dilution of their shares as well.153  On this 
basis, the court determined that AIG’s shareholders had a cognizable right 
to exclude vested in their common shares.154 
In addition to these interests, the Court of Federal Claims found 
Delaware case law to support a cognizable property interest in equity and 
voting power.155  The court cited a series of Delaware cases involving 
equity dilution, where a controlling or influential shareholder causes the 
corporation to issue stock for inadequate consideration, thereby diluting the 
economic value of all the shares.156  In those cases, Delaware has sustained 
a dual, direct, and derivative breach of fiduciary duty claim “premised on 
the theory that the corporation, by issuing additional stock for inadequate 
consideration, made the complaining stockholder’s investment less 
valuable.”157  The court considered these cases as further evidence of a 
property right in the equity value of common shares.  As for the voting 
power of the shares, the court also found Delaware cases supporting a 
protected property interest.158  For the foregoing reasons, the court found a 
cognizable property right in the economic and voting interest in the AIG 
common shares.159  Either through the Share Agreement or the subsequent 
reverse stock split, Starr identified a taking of that property interest.160 
b. Collateral Posted by AIG 
Starr asserted in a derivative action that AIG could have negotiated 
down the value of the collateral posted to its counterparties from face 
value.  The government, according to Starr, directed AIG to give up the full 
value of that collateral, $32.5 billion in cash, rather than negotiate the value 
to around sixty percent of the value.161  In Starr’s view, this constituted a 
 
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Id.  The court disclaimed any final determination on the shareholder’s right to a 
vote on the reverse stock split, but assumed the truth of the allegations. Id. at 73-74. 
 154.  Id. at 74. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. (citing Feldman v. Cutaia, 951 A.2d 727 (Del. 2008); Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 
A.2d 1265 (2007); Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (2006); In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. 
Litig., 634 A.2d 319 (1993)). 
 157.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 74 (internal quotations omitted). 
 158.  Id. at 75 (citing In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 747 A.2d 71, 81 
(Del. Ch. 1999) and Oliver v. Bos. Univ., 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *76 (2006)). 
 159.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 75. 
 160.  Id.  This claim, as far as it constituted a derivative claim, was later dismissed as 
discussed below.  Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 466 (2013). 
 161.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 75. 
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taking.  The court decided that the collateral would be a property interest 
subject to Fifth Amendment protection, although it held the question of the 
parties’ ownership of those rights for the fact-finding stage.162  AIG had 
posted the collateral to secure specific swap transactions.  While general 
obligations to pay money do not constitute an unconstitutional taking of 
property, “[A] specific sum of money, ‘derived from ownership of 
particular deposits in an established account,’ is a protectable property 
interest under the Fifth Amendment.”163  There may not have been any 
separate account in which counterparties held the collateral, but the court 
considered the pledge of security to create a “constructive account.”164  
Additionally, the fact that the parties could transfer the collateral pursuant 
to the ML III transactions supported its property status.165  The court 
ultimately decided that AIG had alleged a property interest in the difference 
between par value and the potentially lower negotiated value, which Starr 
could put forth in a derivative action.166 
c. Voluntariness of the transactions 
The government argued that AIG and the shareholders consented to 
the transactions at issue, thereby foreclosing a taking claim.167  The court 
had already found that the reverse stock split was not executed with the 
previously promised shareholder vote,168 and so it held that the shareholders 
did not consent to the reverse stock split.169  The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York had found that Starr did not plead adequate 
control by the government, largely because the government did not 
formally control AIG’s board of directors.170  Starr, therefore, had to argue 
that the government obtained de facto control through coercive dealings 
with AIG’s management.  Starr had argued that FRBNY had restricted 
AIG’s access to its discount window while taking an aggressive stance in 
 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 75-76 (citing Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 
1339-40) (quoting Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212, 1224-25 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 164.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 76. 
 165.  Id. (citing Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 669 F.3d 1326, 1330 
(Fed. Cir. 2012), which recognized that a core indicator of a property right is the “ability to 
sell, assign, transfer, or exclude.”). 
 166.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 76.  These claims, as discussed below, were later 
dismissed for lack of standing.  Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 469 
(2013). 
 167.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 76.   
 168.  Id. at 74. 
 169.  Id. at 77. 
 170.  Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
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negotiations.171  The court found that Starr had adequately pleaded the 
government’s coercion in the acceptance of the loan agreement.172  
However, the court left open the issue of whether the loan agreement was 
the result of AIG’s own risky business practices, such that the public 
should not have to bear the burden of its bailout.173  Furthermore, the court 
did not decide the matter of the voluntariness of the ML III transactions 
because of the factual issues involved.174 
d. Rough Proportionality Test 
Starr additionally argued that the court should apply Dolan’s “rough 
proportionality” test,175 but the court refused to apply it in this case.176  Starr 
maintained that AIG already provided adequate consideration for the loan 
with the high interest rate and the security in AIG’s assets.  The additional 
equity stake made the compensation disproportionate.177  In other words, 
what AIG’s shareholders received in the transaction was disproportionately 
smaller than what they gave up.  Although the test seems to align well with 
the facts of the case, the court declined to expand the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence by applying the test outside the context of land use 
exactions.178  Furthermore, the court stated that the factual predicates for 
the rough proportionality test were not present.  The test requires that the 
government impose a choice between the offered deal and some exertion of 
regulatory power, such as declining a permit to develop a property.179  
Therefore, the court found that Starr cannot sustain a takings claim based 
on the rough proportionality test. 
e. Dismissal of Derivative Claims 
On April 5, 2013, AIG, as nominal defendant, filed a motion to 
 
 171.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 56. 
 172.  Id. at 79. 
 173.  Id. at 79-80. 
 174.  Id. at 80; see also Ben Prostess & Michael J. De La Merced, Rescued by a Bailout, 
A.I.G. May Sue Its Savior, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Jan. 7, 2013, 10:30 PM, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/rescued-by-a-bailout-a-i-g-may-sue-its-savior/ 
(discussing the fact-intensive forthcoming trial, in preparation for which Starr is “[s]eeking 
[sixteen] million pages in documents from the government.”). 
175.   Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 372, 388 (1994) (requiring a “rough 
proportionality” between the development exactions and the government’s interest in 
regulation). 
 176.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 81-83.  
 177.  Id. at 80-81. 
 178.  Id. at 81-82. (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546-47 (2005)).  
 179.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 82. 
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dismiss the derivative claims for lack of standing.180  The court granted the 
motion, dismissing the claims related to the ML III transactions and to the 
taking of the economic and voting rights in the shares, as far as they 
constituted derivative claims.181  Starr had initially claimed that the demand 
requirement was excused as futile because the Government had controlled 
AIG, so its appointees to the Board could not be expected to join a 
derivative suit against the United States.182  However, after the Government 
had disposed of its controlling shares, Starr had agreed on September 5, 
2012 to make a demand on AIG’s board, but reserved the right to challenge 
AIG’s subsequent refusal.183  AIG’s board ultimately refused the demand 
after extensive discussion by it and its Regulatory, Compliance and Public 
Policy Committee; counsel by three separate law firms; and briefings from 
all parties involved.184  AIG’s board being entitled to business judgment 
protection,185 Starr had a high bar to meet in arguing that the demand was 
futile. 
In rendering this decision, the court was quick to point out its 
concerns.  It was concerned about AIG’s use of experts’ opinions to 
evaluate Starr’s likelihood of success, without those experts possessing all 
the facts in a very fact-dependent case, and the role of the US Treasury’s 
briefings.186  Most notably, however, the court pointed out the “media 
frenzy” that accompanied AIG’s demand discussions, and admonished 
those “public figures and elected officials who apparently lacked any 
understanding that AIG was required to consider entry into the 
 
 180.  Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 465 (2013).  The Government 
also moved to dismiss all of Starr’s other claims.  Id.  “[T]o have standing to sue 
individually, rather than derivatively on behalf of the corporation, the plaintiff must allege 
more than an injury resulting from a wrong to the corporation.”  Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., 
546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988).  
 181.  Starr Int’l Co. II, 111 Fed. Cl. at 482-83. 
 182.  Id. at 464.  To pursue a derivative claim, a shareholder must either demand that the 
corporation’s board of directors pursue the claim and receive a wrongful refusal, or argue 
that the demand is excused for futility because the directors are conflicted.  Wood v. Baum, 
953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 2008). 
 183.  Exhibit A: Agreement By And Between Starr International Co., Inc. and American 
International Group, Inc. 2-3, Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50 (2012) (No. 
11-779C) [hereinafter “Demand Agreement”].  The circumstances of that agreement are not 
clear. Starr must have believed it had a chance to convince AIG to join its suit and wanted to 
make it easier for AIG to hear its argument.  See id. at 3 (explaining that the parties intention 
was “to provide the AIG Board with sufficient time to consider all of the derivative claims 
in an orderly process and to avoid a preliminary dispute concerning the demand excused 
issue.”). 
 184.  Starr Int’l Co. II, 111 Fed. Cl. at 467-69. 
 185.  Id. at 465. 
 186.  Id. 
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lawsuit . . . .”187  Despite these concerns and the public pressure on AIG’s 
board to refuse the suit, the court granted the motion to dismiss on these 
claims. 
3. Takeaways from the court’s opinion 
The Starr case provides both an indication of how courts analyze this 
new breed of takings claims and an example of how takings claims may be 
used to replace a lack of state fiduciary law.  Much of the court’s opinion is 
devoted to analyzing whether Starr held a property interest that could even 
be taken.  The Court of Federal Claims went to great lengths to assemble a 
property right in the shares and collateral payments, looking to both first 
principles of excludability and transferability, along with Delaware case 
law.  The court also rested significant reasoning on the Consent Order from 
the Court of Chancery, which it interpreted to require a vote on any dilution 
of the common shareholders’ stake in AIG.  Given this case-specific 
reasoning, courts may not be able to generalize from it in the next case 
without difficulty. 
The court’s willingness to engage in this extensive exercise 
demonstrates how critical the problem of the government as controlling 
shareholder is.  Mr. Greenburg and his attorney, David Boies, have been 
clear with the media, as well as the court, about the policy implications of 
the case.188  Public sentiment, however, is clearly not on their side.189  Not 
only does the action seem ungrateful, but it also seems misplaced.  If 
 
 187.  Id. (emphasis in original); see also Neal Irwin, AIG Considers Suing Government 
for Bailing it out, World Implodes in on Itself, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2013, 11:29 AM, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/08/aig-considers-suing-
government-for-bailing-it-out-world-implodes-in-on-itself/ (noting the “head-smacking 
disbelief that has accompanied public discourse of the news [of AIG’s potential lawsuit],” 
focusing on comments by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke); Steve Schaefer, AIG: 
Thank You America, But We May Sue You, FORBES, Jan. 8, 2013, 9:05 AM, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2013/01/08/aig-thank-you-america-but-we-may-
sue-you/ (noting that AIG’s board had a duty to its shareholders to consider joining the suit). 
 188.  See Matthew J. Belvedere, Suing US Over AIG Bailout Is Solid, Says Lawyer, 
CNBC, Jan. 10, 2013, 11:49 AM, http://www.cnbc.com/id/100369044 (noting that Boies 
told CNBC that the case “is a test of the limits on what the government can demand in 
return for making loans.”); Zachary Tracer & Elizabeth Bunn, Boies Likens AIG Takeover to 
Firefighters Seizing Goods, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 10, 2013, 9:13 AM, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-10/boies-likens-aig-takeover-to-firefighters-
seizing-goods.html (“[Mr. Boies] . . . said the firm’s takeover was an abuse of authority 
similar to firefighters seizing possessions they rescued from a flood.”). 
 189.  See Phillips, supra note 3 (“The company’s true mistake wasn’t letting the 
government cram an onerous deal down its throat, it was thinking that it could insure 
billions worth of corporate debt the same way it insured cars and houses.  Sometimes you 
get what you deserve.”). 
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shareholders have a problem with a company’s financial straits, they should 
blame their directors, not the government.  The court, however, seems to 
understand the lack of protections shareholders have in cases of 
government bailouts and is, therefore, not so willing to dismiss the suit. 
The litigants may not be entirely sympathetic, but that is no reason to create 
bad law. 
The court defined the case largely within the Penn Central test, rather 
than step beyond the current law and expanded the Dolan rough 
proportionality test.  Dolan’s test protects property owners from the 
government’s imposition of unconstitutional conditions on discretionary 
public benefits.190  The court was in accord with precedent to dismiss its 
application.  Furthermore, adding yet another cumbersome test would have 
significantly impaired the government’s ability to negotiate with potential 
bailout recipients, especially if the court was unclear as to which test would 
apply.  Declining to extend the rough proportionality test gives the 
government a little more certainty as to how a court will review its actions.  
If subsequent cases follow the same path, only “total taking[s]”191 and the 
Penn Central factors will apply to define a taking. 
Finally, the issues related to demand excusal raise an additional 
procedural hurdle for a potential takings plaintiff.  In this case, a “rigorous 
review process and . . . a reasonable decision” were sufficient to uphold a 
refusal under business judgment review.192  Even stoking the court’s 
concerns about the public and governmental pressure on the board was not 
enough to defeat the presumption.193  While those forces emanate from 
outside the boardroom, they could have a real effect on a company’s ability 
to generate value to shareholders, yet they are not enough to establish 
futility. 
III. COMPARING DELAWARE FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND TAKINGS CLAIMS 
OUTCOMES 
The lifecycle of government ownership in a given firm can be divided 
into three stages:  acquisition, management, and disposition.  The court’s 
opinion in Starr relates most clearly to the acquisition stage of the lifecycle, 
 
 190.  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 372, 385 (1994) (“Under the well-settled 
doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the government may not require a person to give 
up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the 
government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.”). 
 191.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 192.  Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 466 (2013); see also Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (1984) (noting that analysis of demand futility is bound to an 
analysis under the business judgment rule). 
 193.  Starr Int’l Co. II, 111 Fed. Cl. at 477-79. 
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which is the most natural fit for a takings claim.  Takings may also provide 
some protection for shareholders in duty of loyalty fact patterns and where 
the company is sold, but on the whole, it is an inadequate substitute for 
fiduciary law.  The fact patterns outlined below track some of the common 
breaches of fiduciary duties and analyze the outcomes under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.  In many of these cases, shareholders could 
have a claim against the board of directors.  In cases of government 
ownership like Starr, however, shareholders are seeking compensation that 
does not involve the company.  Furthermore, the damages could be so large 
as to make the board judgment-proof.194  Therefore, while shareholders 
may have a cause of action against the board, this section will address 
whether the minority shareholders would have a takings claim against the 
government on the same facts. 
A. Stage One: Acquisition 
Starr itself presents the acquisition scenario.  The Court of Federal 
Claims has now opened the door to a compensable taking following the 
government’s acquisition of common shares (given a certain set of facts).  
Allowing these claims, however, diverges from Delaware law in that 
fiduciary law does not impose a burden on the buyer of shares until the 
acquisition is complete.  The Delaware courts have developed a doctrine by 
which minority shareholders may seek damages when a corporation’s 
board of directors issues shares for less than their value.195  That doctrine, 
however, imposes a duty on the board, not on the buyer.  Generally, the 
buyer has no fiduciary duties to the corporation or its shareholders until she 
has taken control.  In this way, takings may actually provide an additional 
layer of shareholder protection not offered by fiduciary law. 
B. Stage Two: Management 
Fiduciary law issues also arise in the ongoing management of a 
corporation.  These duties encompass loyalty to the corporation, care in 
conduct of affairs, and additional protections of shareholder franchise.  The 
Fifth Amendment fails to protect shareholders to the extent that state 
fiduciary law does.  Even where the substantive law might contain 
comparable safeguards, as in the duty of loyalty cases, the procedural 
requirements may prevent adequate redress of shareholder injury. 
 
 194.  See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 69, at 48 (seeking not less than twenty-five billion 
dollars in damages). 
 195.  See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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1. Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty protects the interests of the shareholders from self-
serving actions of management.  Even if fiduciary law did apply to the 
government, actions taken for the public good would likely not be seen as 
self-serving.  However, if the controlling shareholder is on both sides of a 
given transaction, then there might be a cognizable duty of loyalty claim.196  
For example, imagine the government owns a majority stake in two 
American auto companies, AMC and BMC, and controls both boards.  
Following the government bailout in which it obtained its equity stake, 
AMC’s business has turned around, yet BMC continues to struggle.  Citing 
a public need for at least two strong auto companies on its shores, the 
government directs AMC to sell some of its top income-producing assets, 
valued at $500 million to BMC.  In exchange, BMC issues $1,000 in high-
yield debt to AMC.197  The board convenes no independent negotiating 
committee and hires no independent counsel or financial experts.  The 
majority of the disinterested directors vote against the merger, though the 
board still approves the deal.  Just to be safe, the board submits the deal to 
shareholders,198 which is purely a formality, since the government’s shares 
carry the vote. 
Given this scenario, a non-government controlling shareholder would 
likely be held to have breached its duty of loyalty because the price and 
process are clearly unfair.199  A takings claim, however, would be much 
more difficult.  The government’s action would deprive the shareholders of 
the economic value of the AMC assets, to the extent that the corporation 
was not compensated through the BMC bonds.  The shareholders likely 
invested in the company with the expectation that their best assets would 
not be given away for next to nothing.  Furthermore, the government’s 
action has the character of a taking, in that it is moving the asset from a 
corporation under its control to another corporation under its control, 
depriving the AMC shareholders at the benefit of BMC’s shareholders and 
the public at large. 
The assets here—likely manufacturing plants, brands, and materials—
are certainly property interests of the corporation.  AMC can exclude others 
from their use and transfer them to whomever it chooses.  Under the Starr 
 
 196.  Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 442 (Del. 1996). 
 197.  In order to conduct this secondary bailout of BMC, the transaction necessarily must 
be unfair.  AMC cannot transfer its assets to BMC at their true net present value because it 
would defeat the purpose of the transfer. 
 198.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (West 2014) (requiring a shareholder vote for 
sales of “all or substantially all . . . assets.”). 
 199.  See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (requiring entire 
fairness review for duty of loyalty claims against controlling shareholders). 
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reasoning, the shareholders would likely not be able to maintain a direct 
claim against the government.  In this hypothetical scenario, the 
government caused AMC to transfer its best assets in exchange for very 
little consideration from BMC.  As in Gatz and Rossette, the controlling 
shareholder received the benefit from the transaction at the expense of the 
other shareholders.200  This hypothetical deal did not, however, involve 
compensation in the form of stock, and the Delaware courts have been 
largely unwilling to extend the equity dilution too far.201  Therefore, unless 
the shareholder-plaintiff can meet the standards for demand excusal, the 
claim would not be sustained.  The Court of Federal Claims, however, may 
be more willing to allow a direct suit where the plaintiff merely “seek[s] 
compensation for the improper extraction of the economic value” of his 
shares,202 even if the factual predicates are not fully established.  Therefore, 
a takings claim may be sustained, although it is not clear through which 
procedural hurdles a shareholder-plaintiff would have to jump.203 
2. The Business Judgment Rule & the Duty of Care 
Corporate law’s business judgment rule provides extensive protections 
for board decisions in the interest of allowing for risk-taking and avoiding 
recurrent litigation following failed business ventures.  In reviewing a 
challenged course of action, the court  
presum[es] that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.204  
Unless the plaintiff can rebut that presumption by showing a breach of the 
duty of care or duty of loyalty, “[A] court will not substitute its judgment 
for that of the board if the . . . decision can be attributed to any rational 
business purpose.”205  A shareholder may show a breach of the duty of care 
 
 200.  Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265, 1280-81 (Del. 2007); Gentile v. Rossette, 906 
A.2d 91, 102-03 (Del. 2006). 
 201.  See, e.g., Feldman v. Cutaia, 956 A.2d 644, 658 (Del. Ch. 2007) (refusing to 
aggregate the shares held by a company’s directors to find a control block). 
 202.  Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 65 (2012). 
 203.  AIG has declined to join Starr’s suit against the United States, jeopardizing Starr’s 
derivative claims.  Michael J. De La Merced, Greenberg Forges Ahead With Lawsuit Over 
A.I.G. Bailout, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Mar. 12, 2013, 2:06 PM, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/greenberg-forges-ahead-with-lawsuit-over-a-i-g-
bailout.  
 204.  Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 705-06 (Del. 2009) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 205.  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (internal 
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if the board of directors acted unadvisedly.206 
At one point in the history of regulatory takings, courts may have been 
willing to judge how well the taking accomplished its public purpose.  
Agins v. City of Tiburon set forth a standard for a compensable taking, 
stating that “[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property 
effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate 
state interests.”207  The Supreme Court, however, later rejected the test, 
criticizing it as derived from the Due Process clause and not fit for a 
takings analysis.208  The problem with the test, the Court said, was that it 
“suggests a means-end test:  [i]t asks, in essence, whether a regulation of 
private property is effective in achieving some legitimate public 
purpose.”209  Furthermore, it “reveals nothing about the magnitude or 
character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private 
property rights.”210  As a practical matter,  
[t]he Agins formula can be read to demand heightened means-end 
review of virtually any regulation of private property.  If so 
interpreted, it would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a 
vast array of state and federal regulations — a task for which 
courts are not well suited.211   
Just as the Delaware courts will not second-guess decisions of the board 
within the requirements of the business judgment rule, takings claims do 
not present an opportunity for a court to impose its ex post decision-making 
on the government.  Likewise, takings do not require that the government 
acted advisedly.  Those judgments are left to the realm of the due process 
claims.  Thus, under the Takings Clause, the government enjoys a similar 
insulation from attacks on its decision-making, but it is not subject to an 
attack that it acted without requisite knowledge. 
3. Protection of Shareholder Votes 
Although the Delaware courts have time and again recognized the 
 
quotations omitted). 
 206.  See Gantler, 965 A.2d at 706 (noting that a board must act advisedly for its 
decision to be entitled to the business judgment presumption).  In the context of a merger, 
for example, the Court of Chancery will generally require that the board have received 
opinions from both legal counsel and financial experts, such as investment banker(s).  See 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872, 876-878 (Del. 1985) (insisting on expert 
opinions to aid the board of directors). 
 207.  447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).  
 208.  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).   
 209.  Id. at 542 (emphasis in original). 
 210.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 211.  Id. at 544. 
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importance of protecting the shareholder franchise, shareholders are 
unlikely to find similar protections in cases of government control.  
Delaware has established that the business judgment rule does not attach to 
those actions of a board of directors done with the “primary purpose” of 
interfering with a shareholder vote.212  Rather than the lenient business 
judgment rule standard, the board must provide a “compelling justification” 
for any such action.213  Similarly, the Court of Federal Claims recognized a 
property interest in the voting power of shares under certain circumstances.  
Under Delaware law, shareholders are frequently entitled to a vote.214 
Starr’s companion complaint in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York presented a similar claim for breach of 
fiduciary law.215  Starr argued that the reverse stock split was brought about 
for the primary purpose of circumventing the class-wise vote that would 
have been required to increase the number of authorized shares.216  The 
court dismissed on the dual basis that Starr had not alleged adequate 
control of the Federal Reserve Bank and that fiduciary duties do not apply 
to agencies of the United States.217 
A shareholder may have a claim against a private board of directors in 
the same situation, though it is not clear that Blasius would apply.  In 
recent years, the Delaware courts have narrowed the applicability of the 
Blasius rule to the point that it may only apply to director elections.218  
Furthermore, the court normally applies it to scenarios where a vote is 
altogether circumvented.  In the alleged scenario, the shareholders did 
 
 212.  Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 662 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also 
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 440 (Del. 1971) (reversing the denial of a 
request for an injunction against a corporation’s plan to change the date of an annual 
stockholders meeting); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 777 (Del. Ch. 
1967) (finding a violation of fiduciary duty where the corporation issued stock for the 
purpose of diluting a shareholder’s interest in the company). 
 213.  Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661.   
 214.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West 2014) (providing for a shareholder 
vote on mergers); Id. at § 271 (requiring a shareholder vote for a sale of “all or substantially 
all of [the corporation’s] property and assets.”). 
 215.  Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202, 211-12 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 216.  Id. at 214. 
 217.  Id. at 214-15. 
 218.  See Mercier v. Inter-Tel Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 809 (Del. Ch. 2007) (interpreting MM 
Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) “as signaling . . . that the 
stringency of the Blasius approach should be reserved largely for director election contests 
or election contests having consequences for corporate control.”); see also City of Westland 
Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Techs., Inc., 1 A.3d 281, 289 (Del. 2010) (declining to 
extend Blasius to the context of Section 220 inspection requests); Yucaipa Am. Alliance 
Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 330-336 (Del. Ch. 2010) (declining to extend Blasius to 
the adoption of a poison pill).  
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approve the reverse stock split via the proxy vote, although the 
government’s controlling shares participated.219  A Delaware court may, 
however, apply equitable doctrines to find a breach of fiduciary duty.220  In 
this scenario, AIG purportedly recommended the reverse stock split due to 
the risk of de-listing.221  If the genuine, primary purpose were to avoid the 
vote on the increase to authorized shares, then the court may find a breach 
of fiduciary duty. 
Starr’s suit in the Court of Federal Claims advances a takings claim on 
the same facts.  Insofar as a litigant can claim a property right in his 
franchise, he would likely have a viable takings claim that would apply in 
more cases than Blasius would.  That property right, however, is unlikely to 
arise in most cases of government control.  The court was willing to accept 
the pleading of a property right in a class-wise vote based on AIG’s 
previous representations to the Court of Chancery.222  Delaware corporate 
law does entitle shareholders to a vote in other cases, such as in cases of an 
increase in the number of authorized shares223 or in mergers where the 
shareholder’s corporation will not survive,224 which would be sufficient to 
create a property right.  If the government, however, already holds a 
controlling position via common shares, then it has little reason to 
circumvent a shareholder vote.  Furthermore, even if the government held 
preferred shares, Delaware law does not generally provide for a class vote.  
In the case of amendments to the authorized shares, however, the Delaware 
code does provide for a class-wise vote. 
In Starr, however, the shareholders did receive a vote on the 
amendment to the certificate of incorporation, but the reverse stock split 
diluted their shares with the government’s vote controlling.  The Court of 
Federal Claims held that Starr adequately pleaded a property right in a 
class-wise vote on the government’s conversion to common shares based 
on AIG’s representations in the Court of Chancery.225  Absent those 
representations, the shareholders may not have a property right in a class-
wise vote, unless the Delaware statutes so provide.226  Therefore, the 
 
 219.  Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 58 (2012). 
 220.  See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) 
(providing the oft-quoted principle that because a course of action is legally possible does 
not mean it is permissible). 
 221.  See Russnow, supra note 86 (explaining AIG’s “rationale” for the reverse stock 
split: “if the stock falls below a dollar . . . the New York Stock Exchange may delist 
them.”). 
 222.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 73. 
 223.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (West 2014). 
 224.  Id. at § 251. 
 225.  Starr Int’l Co., 106 Fed. Cl. at 73. 
 226.  Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (West 2014) (establishing that “holders of 
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common shareholders may have a claim in the most egregious cases, such 
as the government completely disregarding a vote, but in the most likely 
cases they will not have a cognizable takings claim. 
C. Stage Three: Disposition 
The government’s inevitable discharge of its ownership stake or the 
sale of the corporation itself presents the clearest need for adequate 
protections for share value.  The Delaware courts have recognized the need 
to scrutinize these transactions between private parties.  In the context of 
government ownership, however, shareholders continue to face significant 
hurdles in the protection of their investments.  In these cases, the 
shareholders may have a takings claim. 
Since these claims will often be derivative, however, the plaintiffs will 
be required to fulfill the demand requirements.  The pressures from outside 
the boardroom noted in the Starr opinion make it seem as if the plaintiff 
should never make the demand on the board.227  However, the standard for 
excusal is not much more forgiving.228  Given these circumstances, suits 
arising from the sale of corporate property will face difficult procedural 
hurdles. 
1. Sale of Control 
Fiduciary issues involving the sale of control divide into two major 
categories:  (1) the sale of control to a corporate raider and (2) selling the 
board or a corporate asset.  Courts will generally find a breach of fiduciary 
duty when the controlling shareholder reaps a premium, usually a 
conspicuously large payment, to a party whom the seller should have 
known was going to raid the corporation’s assets in bad faith.229  The 
 
the outstanding shares of a class shall be entitled to vote as a class upon a proposed 
amendment . . . ”). 
 227.  See Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 470 (2013) (“In making a 
demand on the board, a shareholder not only tacitly concedes [the] lack of self-interest and 
independence of a majority of the Board, but expressly concedes both issues.”) (internal 
quotations omitted).  
 228.  See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (stating that the plaintiff 
must allege “particularized facts [to create] a reasonable doubt . . . that: (1) the directors are 
disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product 
of a valid exercise of business judgment.”).  
 229.  See e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 21 N.E.2d 331, 333-34 (N.Y. 1939) (holding that a 
controlling shareholder may not sell his control stake for the purpose of personal gain); 
Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 235 (Del. Ch. 1990) (holding that a shareholder selling 
control breaches the duty of care if he “may or should reasonably foresee danger to other 
shareholders.”). 
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government is unlikely to sell its controlling share to a party who will 
destroy the company it had worked hard to revive, so a takings claim based 
on those facts is unlikely. 
Scholars used to debate the characterization of the control premium.  
Professor Berle argued that control itself was a corporate asset, the 
premium for which should be vested in the corporation.230  Under that view, 
shareholders may have a cognizable takings claim for the sale of control 
itself.  However, the courts have largely rejected that view and will allow a 
controlling shareholder to accept a control premium, which he does not 
have to share with the minority shareholders.231  A premium may be 
invalidated, however, if it reflects the sale of the board232 or the sale of a 
corporate asset.233 
The government, however, may still run into a problem if it appears to 
be selling the board alone, which can arise when the shareholder receives 
too high a premium given the number of shares being sold.  Fiduciary law 
accepts that a control of the board will inevitably follow the sale of a 
significant percentage of shares such that, for example, an agreement that 
existing directors will resign and appoint their successors is not illegal per 
se.234  If that ownership percentage falls below the amount whereby control 
would inevitably flow, however, then it is deemed to be the selling the 
board itself.235  The government could find itself in this position if it has 
drawn down its equity stake below a legally controlling amount, yet still 
 
 230.  ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 216-19 (1932).  But see Thomas L. Hazen, Transfers of Corporate 
Control and Duties of Controlling Shareholders — Common Law, Tender Offers, 
Investment Companies — and a Proposal for Reform, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1977) 
(explaining some of the critiques of Berle’s position). 
 231.   See Abraham v. Emerson Radio Co., 901 A.2d 751, 761-62 (Del. Ch. 2006) 
(“[P]ure control premium envy is not a cognizable claim for a minority stockholder under 
Delaware law.”); Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 389 (1979) (stating that 
minority stockholders are not entitled to the opportunity to share equally in any premium 
paid for a controlling interest in the corporation).  
 232.  See Brecher v. Gregg, 89 Misc. 457, 464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding that a four 
percent shareholder who received a control premium was required to forfeit the premium to 
the company). 
 233.  See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955) (invalidating a control 
premium where it reflected the sale of the going concern value of the company). 
 234.  See, e.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 579 (2d Cir. 1962) 
(holding that contract for sale of 28.3% of stock of a publicly held corporation, that included 
a clause giving purchaser the option to require seriatim director resignation, was not invalid 
per se as a matter of state law). 
 235.  See id. (requiring a minority shareholder challenging a sale “to show that . . . there 
was at the time some concretely foreseeable reason why [the buyer’s] wishes would not 
have prevailed in the shareholder voting held in due course.”); see also Brecher, 89 Misc. at 
464 (invalidating promised resignations by a shareholder who only held four percent of 
stock). 
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maintains effective control of the board.  This could arise when no other 
shareholder holds a significant percentage of shares.  The government may 
want to pass control of the board to a shareholder that will not unwind its 
work with the company.  Furthermore, it would likely be under public 
pressure to break even, at least, on the bailout transaction.  For these 
reasons, the government may hypothetically negotiate a premium in 
exchange for the current board’s appointment of the purchaser’s designated 
directors. 
With any other seller, shareholders would likely have a derivative 
claim under fiduciary law for the sale of the board with the premium 
proceeds paid back to the company.236  A takings claim would likely also 
be derivative because the defendant normally pays the excess premium for 
the sale of control back to the company.  Value alone, however, is not 
enough to confer property status.237  Shareholders generally maintain the 
right to elect directors.238  The company cannot transfer the board seats to 
anyone it wants or for any compensation it wants, as a shareholder can 
generally override the board’s appointment of directors, given enough 
shares.  On the one hand, Delaware law seems to recognize a property 
interest in the voting rights of shares.239  The sale of a board seat obstructs 
the exercise of those rights by circumventing an election.  On the other 
hand, the voting power of the shares is not permanently affected, as the 
shareholder could hypothetically exercise his vote at the next shareholder’s 
meeting.  The Fifth Amendment, however, does not distinguish between 
temporary and permanent takings.240  Shareholders would likely have a 
takings claim where the government merely sells board seats. 
2. Sale of the Company 
The sale of the entire company presents the clearest need for 
shareholder protections.  A merger will force a payout price on the 
shareholders, who depend on the board to find the best bid.  Delaware 
fiduciary law accordingly imposes a duty on the board to maximize 
shareholder value when the Board or controlling shareholder is selling the 
company.241  Delaware will also employ an entire fairness standard of 
 
 236.  Brecher, 89 Misc. at 464 (“[T]he illegal profit belongs to the corporation.”). 
 237.  Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 157 (1998). 
 238.  Under Delaware law, at least one class of stock must be entitled to vote.  Each 
share receives one vote unless otherwise specified.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (West 
2014). 
 239.  See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 240.  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., Cal., 
482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987). 
 241.  See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 
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review if the controlling shareholder forces a merger on the minority 
shareholders without a special negotiating committee, disinterested director 
approval, or a majority vote by disinterested shareholders.242 
Recall our struggling auto companies.  The government has purchased 
a controlling stake in the common shares of a failing American auto 
company.  The majority of the directors have strong ties to the government, 
and they are not considered disinterested or independent.  After a period of 
time, the government decides it cannot turn the company around on its own 
and, overturning a long history of independence, determines that a merger 
with another auto company would be the best option.  After initial bidding 
from two major American automakers (which it does not control), the 
government strikes a deal for a cash-out merger.  Before the shareholders 
meeting, however, a foreign car company makes a significantly higher, all-
cash bid.  The government does not want to weather the political firestorm 
that would ensue if it were seen to be selling off a great American asset.  It 
further believes that the employees would fare better under a domestic 
company, which will keep plants open in the country.  For those reasons 
only, it rejects the bid, recommending the initial deal to the shareholders 
and voting its shares in favor. 
A private board would most likely be held to have violated its 
fiduciary duties.243  Revlon established that consideration of “non-
stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders 
is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the 
corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.”244  In this scenario, 
the board, controlled by the government, has put the company on the 
auction block, triggering the duty to maximize shareholder value.  
Furthermore, the government, as shareholder, failed to achieve a fair price 
through fair process because it decided to forgo a higher premium for 
 
1987) (“[A] shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or 
exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.”); see also McMullin v. Beran, 
765 A.2d 910, 919 (Del. 2000) (asserting, “When a board is presented with the majority 
shareholder’s proposal to sell the entire corporation to a third party, the ultimate focus on 
value maximization is the same as if the board itself had decided to sell the corporation to a 
third party.”); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113-14 (Del. 1994) 
(explaining that, in Delaware, a minority shareholder who exercises control over the 
corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and other shareholders). 
 242.  See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (imposing an entire 
fairness review where the controlling shareholder pushes through a merger transaction); 
Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (deciding that the use of a special negotiating committee shifts the 
entire fairness burden to the plaintiff). 
 243.  See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182-83 
(Del. 1986) (requiring the board to maximize shareholder value when it initiates an active 
bidding process).  
 244.  Id. at 182. 
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reasons other than its minority shareholders.  If fiduciary law applied, the 
government would have breached its duties when it decided to favor 
workers and politics over shareholders.245 
The minority shareholders could have a takings claim in this fact 
pattern.  The government is taking their shares for public use in exchange 
for inadequate compensation.  The court would likely see this as a “total 
taking”246 since the shareholders are permanently and completely deprived 
of their shares, but the Penn Central factors also point to a taking.  The 
economic impact to the shareholders could be immense.  Furthermore, 
given the Revlon rule, shareholders likely had an expectation, at the time of 
investment, that the company’s board of directors will seek to maximize 
the value of their shares in any merger agreement.  Those expectations 
might, however, be different if shareholders purchased their shares after the 
government had taken control.247  Since the shares are personal property 
under Delaware law,248 the property requirement would not be at issue.  A 
stock-for-stock deal would similarly result in a complete taking of the 
shares.  Minority shareholders, however, would have a greater burden to 
prove inadequate compensation because they could sell the shares.249  
Therefore, the Takings Clause likely provides substantive protections in the 
merger context similar to Delaware fiduciary law.  The remedies for these 
takings, however, would likely fall short of what a shareholder would seek 
under a claim for breach of fiduciary duties. 
D. A Brief Note on Remedies 
The remedies available in a takings claim generally are not the kinds 
of remedies that a shareholder would seek in Chancery.  Particularly in 
cases of mergers, shareholders will seek an injunction to stop the actions of 
the board of directors or controlling shareholder.  The Takings Clause, 
however, does not prohibit the taking altogether, but only requires 
compensation.250  In some cases of private control, such as in cases of 
squeeze-out mergers, the minority shareholders will similarly have no right 
to an injunction.  The Delaware courts, however, have provided for a 
 
 245.  See id. (“A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its 
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”). 
 246.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). 
 247.  The shareholders may have had no expectation of value maximization if they 
expected fiduciary duties not to apply to the government. 
 248.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 159 (West 2014). 
 249.  The same rationale underlies Delaware’s denial of appraisal rights where the 
shareholders hold stock that were either publicly or widely traded.  Id. at § 262(b)(1). 
 250.  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., Cal., 
482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987). 
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“quasi-appraisal” remedy beyond the statutory appraisal procedures.251  Just 
compensation under the Takings Clause is “normally . . . measured by the 
market value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously 
paid in money.”252  “Deviation from this measure of just compensation has 
been required only when market value has been too difficult to find, or 
when its application would result in manifest injustice to [the] owner or 
public.”253  In some cases, the fair market value is easy to find, such as a 
merger where the government declines a topping bid.  In other cases, 
however, where no market test has been performed, finding the fair market 
value may be more difficult.  Weinberger v. UOP is famous for opening 
valuation to “any techniques or methods which are generally considered 
acceptable in the financial community . . . .”254  Modern financial analysts 
generally use discounted cash-flow analysis.  Those techniques, however, 
may be unacceptable in the takings context.255  Therefore, even if minority 
shareholders can find a sustainable takings claim, the relief available may 
not satisfy them.256 
CONCLUSION 
The Takings Clause provides an important backstop to highly 
inequitable government action, but it is unlikely to solve effectively the 
problem of the government as controlling shareholder.  In some ways, it 
provides protections not available under Delaware fiduciary law in that it 
imposes burdens on the government’s initial acquisition of shares.  It also 
provides critical protections in the merger and duty of loyalty contexts, 
when the shareholders are most vulnerable.  In other areas, it falls short.  
While it provides a right to adequate compensation in a merger, a 
shareholder will not be able to secure injunctive relief.  The duty of loyalty 
protections can become mired in procedural difficulties, and the duty of 
care protections are completely absent.  And where the substantive law is 
most applicable, as in the sale of the company cases, the procedural 
 
 251.  See Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (applying a “quasi-
appraisal” where a majority shareholder forced a merger transaction on minority 
shareholders without fair price or fair process). 
 252.  United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 253.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 254.  Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713. 
 255.  See, e.g., Metlyn Realty Corp. v. Esmark, Inc., 763 F.2d 826, 836 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(“Cash flow studies may be necessary when there is no other way to find value, but they are 
not the best way.”). 
 256.  See J.W. Verret, supra note 8, at 309 (noting that shareholders seeking an 
injunction will be disappointed). 
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requirements and remedies can make sufficient relief impossible. 
Courts walk a fine line in bailout cases, and the stakes are high.  On 
the one hand, the court must protect the constitutional right of private 
parties to receive adequate compensation whenever the government takes 
its property.  On the other hand, the court must be mindful not to impose 
too high a standard such that it impairs the government’s ability to save the 
national economy in times of crisis.  Starr exposes that tension.  While the 
public clearly will not shed a tear for the plaintiff, the pleadings expose a 
government that may have asked for too much in return for its aid. 
The best protection for shareholders must come from the government 
protecting shareholders from itself.  A well-planned bailout can protect the 
interests of shareholders such that the shortcomings of the Takings Clause 
are never exposed.  Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have 
suggested certain designs that would “block political interference by 
reducing the power to interfere, minimizing the opportunities to do so, and 
increasing the political cost.”257  They suggest that the government insulate 
itself from the ongoing business of the corporation by investing in debt 
rather than equity or “through a legally binding process for the appointment 
of directors and the voting of shares.”258  Furthermore, they note that 
“[b]inding time limits on government ownership are the single most 
powerful means of insulating firms from political pressure.”259 
J.W. Verret goes a step further to suggest that the Department of 
Treasury might set up fiduciary principles for the conduct of a bailout, 
together with an effective process to sue for violations of those rules.260  
Rather than investing through equity or bonds, Verret suggests the 
government hold “frozen options” to “limit the inherent drawbacks to the 
Treasury holding common equity, while also letting the taxpayer 
participate in the benefits of the bailout . . . .”261  Like Kahan and Rock, 
Verret also recommends “a clear timeline for [Government] ownership 
of . . . stocks through a sunset provision . . . subject to challenge if the 
 
 257.  Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1360. 
 258.  Id. at 1361. 
 259.  Id. at 1363.  The authors recognize, however, that the quick exits come with 
tradeoffs.  Specifically, if Congress forces the government to pull out too soon, it could 
undo the work done to save the company.  Id. 
 260.  Verret, supra note 8, at 346 (citing as precedent “the Resolution Trust Corporation 
(RTC), established to effectuate a government bailout of the savings and loan industry, 
[which] was created by enabling legislation that significantly waived sovereign immunity.”).  
Beneficiaries of the RTC were able to sue the RTC for breaches of the fiduciary rules 
established in the legislation.  Id. at 346-47. 
 261.  Id. at 347.  “[Frozen options] are options to purchase common stock that 
governments are not permitted to exercise, but which subsequent purchasers in the market 
are permitted to exercise.”  Id. 
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Treasury later changes its mind.”262  He additionally suggests that the 
Treasury establish a clear sales plan for how it will unwind its ownership.263  
If the Government chooses to implement these suggestions, shareholders 
will not have to rely on the ill-suited provisions of the Takings Clause. 
This Comment has sought to address the extent to which the Takings 
Clause can protect shareholders as well as state fiduciary law.  The Court 
of Federal Claims, however, will have the first official statement in Starr.  
Whatever its ultimate conclusion, it has already taken the position that, 
given the right facts, there can be a cognizable takings claim.  But Starr 
presents only a fraction of potential takings scenarios.  While takings 
claims can provide an important stopgap in the most egregious cases of 




 262.  Id. at 350. 
 263.  Id. 
